1.

Introduct ion
Post-war advances in computer technology have favoured the introduction and use of computer-based decision and choice models in the area of both micro-and macro-economics. This trend has been favoured by tx*o circumstances : {1) the enormous progress made in designing and implementing operational models based on advanced mathematical, statistical and econometrie tools, and (2) the potential offered by modern computer software allowing the researcher to deal with complex and large-scale systems.
This development has exerted a deep-going impact on decision analysis.
Decision analysis aims at judging a range of feasible options on the basis of a set of relevant evaluation criteria so as to eliminate less desirable options and to identify the most favourable alternative(s). In macro-economie decision analysis, however, the researcher is usually confronted with intriguing problems such as: a macroeconomie system is usually displaying a multidimensional complexity, so that an integrated view is very hard to obtain; the system is influenced by multiple (formal and informal) actors with conflicting priorities and interests, so that an unambiguous macro-economie welfare criterion is lacking; there is a wide variety of diverse regions in a national system each of them interacting with the nation as a whole and with the other regions.
These considerations lead us to the specification of the following requirements for an integrated macro-economie model for decision analysis:
The model should -in addition to (socio-)economie componentsalso include environmental and energy components so as to allow one to study the system at hand from an integrated viewpoint.
The model should also incorporate the objectives set forth by (formal and informal)actors so as to do justice to the existence of diverging interests in society (leading to multiple objective analysis).
The model should also encompass spatial dimensions in order to take account of the regional diversity of a complex national system. These requirements imply a plea for an integrated multi-objective multi-regional model. This paper aims at presenting such a model for integrated economic-environmental-energy policy analysis in the Netherlands. Section 2 will describe some general methodological features of such a model. Next, in section 3 a plea will be made in favour of interactive decision analysis in order to provide a method for conflict resolution. Then in section 4, a conceptual version of a so-called Triple Layer Model will be presented, foliowed by a specification of an operational model in section 5.
Further details and empirical results wi.ll.be discussed in sections 5 and 6, respectively.
Integrated Macro-economie Policy Models
A complete macro-economie policy model provides a stylized and consistent picture of (a part of) a complex reality. In general, economie, environmental and socio-political models may be regarded as images of the real world created by model-builders. Models used in policy analysis should be able to present the boundaries within which policy decisions are to be made, the tradeoffs inherent in choosing alternative solutions, the impacts of policy measures on a set of relevant policy targets, possibilities for a communication between experts (or planners) and decision-makers, and the sensitivity for changes in the spatial scale, the time horizon or the level of measurement of variables.
Such methodological conditions are hardly fulfilled in modeling practice, so that the determination and the judgement of the unique optimal state of the system is fraught with difficulties. Consequently, many conventional programming approaches have only a limited validity in the practice of policy analysis. That is also the reason why -instead of optimality analyses -impact analyses, effectiveness analyses, decision support analyses and strategie decision analyses have received increasing attention in recent years. In such analyses, much emphasis is placed on the effects of policy objectives and policy instruments, the role of conflict management and the meaning of compromise principles.
Another reason explaining why many conventional programming models have only a limited relevance in policy analysis is the fact that such models are usually based on a set of stringent assumptions, such as: the existence of one known decision-maker, complete information on all relevant objectives and instruments, perfect insight into the impact of policy measures on socio-economie objectives, absence of equity problems and of spatial or social spillover effects, a stable (often linear) structure of the economy, and so forth.
It is conceivable that these notions are especially relevant in an integrated economie, environmental, 'energy and regional policy analysis (see also Issaev et al., 1982) .
Integrated economic-environmental-energy modelling has become increasingly complicated over the last decade. Systems theoretic concepts, optimal control models, game-theoretic approaches and multidisciplinary analyses have become necessary tools for economicenvironmental-energy analyses. There is a strong tendency towards a more coherent and integrated analysis, in which economie, environmental, energy and regional aspects are brought together in one consistent framework (see Lakhsmanan and Nijkamp, 1980) . This need for integrated modelling is mainly caused by the fact that the postwar economie growth paradigm intertwined with technological, scientific and educational progress and rising population numbers, has overlooked inter alia the social and ecological dimensions of this process and hence has led to a serious threat for the man-made and natural environment. This development can not only be observed in the developed countries, but also in the Third World countries, especially in those areas where a rapid industrial expansion is not accompanied by sufficiënt monetary resources for environmental protection and pollution abatement.
Integrated planning and policy models provide essentially some necessary means to restore the balance in favour of more emphasis on environmental dimensions (cf. also Guldman and Shefer, 1981) .
As environmental and energy policy analysis usually takes place in a complex field with conflicting goals, various social interests, multiple decision groups and power structures, this analysis should necessarily take account of the multidimensional nature of environmental and energy -4 -problems (see Nijkamp, 1980 Hafkamp and Nijkamp, 1982a, and Hafkamp, 1983) .
The foregoing remarks lead us to the specification of the following requirements on a relevant integrated policy analysis (see also principles.
In the remaining part of the present paper we will make an attempt at developing an integrated approach to regional-economic-environmentalenergy policy analysis by using the so-called Triple-Layer Model (TLM) (see Hafkamp and Nijkamp, 1982b) . It will be shown that recently developed interactive (integrated economic-environmental-energy) policy models appe^^ to provide a promising perspective for an integrat.* multiple objective policy analysis. Two elements are central in such approaches, viz. efficiënt (or Pareto) solutions for conflicting objectives and interactive strategies among analysts and policy-makers.
In this regard, it will also be demonstrated that multi-regional inputoutput analysis is a necessary part of a meaningful and consistent framework for the abovementioned approach.
Interactive Multiobjective Programming Models
In this section, a brief intrpduction to interactive multiobjective decision analysis will be given, as this approach makes up one of the foundation stones of the abovementioned TLM. Interactive decision analysis is one of the fruitful results of modern high speed computer technology. This approach to decision analysis aims at including in a stepwise manner various political (or subjective) considerations in formal optimizing models characterized by multiple policy objectives.
After a specification of conflicting objectives and the identification of a feasible (not necessarily the most desirable) compromise solution, a set of additional policy desires (for instance, minimum achievement levels, reference points, or aspiration levels) may be introduced so as to find a new feasible compromise solution that is more satisfactory.
Interactive approaches have several advantages : a closer involvement of actors in the choice proeess, a procedural view of planning, a 'satisficing' instead of an optimizing behaviour, a greater flexibility by means of simulation experiments or scenario analyses, and a greater potential for practical applications (especially because no policy weights have to be specified). The majority of these interactive approaches are based on a reference point optimization technique, in which an attempt is made at minimizing the discrepancy between a series of points on the efficiency frontier and a reference point. It has to be added that especially procedural interactive policy analyses may be very helpful tools in policy negotiations on conflicting issues.
Some essential elements of interactive multiple objective analysis will now briefly be described.
Suppose a general model containing a vector of decision variables ^ (instruments, e.g.), of policy target variables w (with elements w., i=l,...,l), of other endogenous variables x , and of exogenous data v :
Then under certain conditions the following reduced form for the targets may be assumed:
In addition to (2), a set of constraints (technical, social, political, economie, etc.) on the whole system may be defined:
where K represents a feasible area for the variables at hand. Then Consequently, an efficiënt solution supposesthat no other feasible policy exists, which is equally good for all policy criteria and better for at least one criterion (cf. Despontin, 1980; Nijkamp, 1978 Nijkamp, , 1979 .
In general, one may impose the condition that any good policy mix is an efficiënt solution, although it is clear that in practice many inferior solutions may occur. Nevertheless, a meaningful policy analysis should focus the attention in particular on the efficiency frontier (or Pareto curve) in order to identify a policy that will not be dominated by other policies. This is especially important in the framework of interactive policy models which usually aim at identifying in a stepwise fashion a compromise solution located on the efficiency frontier. The identification of a 'satisficing' (compromise) solution is however, a far frem easy task.
Fortunately, in the field of mathematical programming and mathematical economics, in recent years much work has been undertaken to formulate operational optimization procedures for problems with multiple objectives (see among others, Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; Cohon, 1979; Rietveld, 1980, and Nijkamp and Spronk, 1981) . At present, there is a whole spectrum of different multiobjective methods available, both in the field of continuous programming analysis (see, e.g. Nijkamp, 1979) and in the field of discrete plan and project evaluation methods (see, e.g. Voogd,
1982).
It should be noted however that many of these procedures have not been specifically designed for macro-economie decision-making. The usefulness of these diverse methods and procedures for macro-economie policy analysis very much depends on the way macro-oriented priorities and conflicts can be taken into account. With respect to this issue, it may be meaningful to distinguish these methods and procedures according to the information available on the decision-maker's preferences (see, e.g. Hwang and Masud, 1979) . Three cases may then be distinghuished:
(1) full information, (2) limited information and (3) no information.
Especially in case of limited or zero information, interactive procedures may be very helpful. Many problems in an integrated policy analysis do not require an unambiguous solution that represents once and for all the optimal state of the system concerned: compromise strategies appear to prevail. In the light of the process character of many decision problems, an interactive policy analysis may therefore, be a reasonable and operational approach. This approach is usually composed of a series of steps based on a systematic exchange of information (based on computer experiments) between decision-makers and analysts. Such interactive approaches are normally characterized by the following pair of steps:
the analysts propose meaningful and feasible (trial) solutions on the basis of a well-defined compromise procedure.
the decision-makers respond to each (trial) solution by indicating in which respect (i.e., in regard to which effects) the proposed compromise is still unsatisfactory (given their views on mimimum achievement levels, aspiration levels, etc). These pairs of steps are then successively repeated, until after a series computer experiments, a final satisfactory compromise solution has been identified. As mentioned before, a large number of interactive models has recently been developed (see among others, Rietveld, 1980 and Spronk, 1981) .
Interactive policy analyses based on multiobjective programming methods have already demonstrated their meaning in various policy problems, also in a macro-economie context. They may be regarded as having many significant advantages compared to traditional optimization methods (see Nijkamp and Spronk, 1981) .
In the present paper, only one specific type of interactive policy method will be dealt with, viz. the method of displaced ideals (see Zeleny, 1976 and Nijkamp, 1980) . It is a method which needs no explicit More details regarding this method can be found in Hafkamp and Nijkamp (1982b) and Hafkamp (1983) .
The abovementioned procedure can also be directly related to scenario analyses for macro-economie policy-making. A scenario is a consistent set of prospective values of plans, goals, instruments and exogenous circumstances. Both single and compound may be dealt with. Choices among different scenarios may also be generated by means of the abovementioned interactive multiobjective methods.
A Conceptual Triple-Layer Model (TLM)
TLM is a model of a spatial system where economie, environmental and socio-political aspects are integrated. The spatial element implies that the system is analyzed at the level of regions interacting with the national level. Consequently, TLM is a national-regional economie environmental model. TLM is a result of projecting a complex reality on three mutually interacting parallel layers:
an economie layer an employment layer an environmental layer.
Several aspects of a complex and multidimensional system can thus be depicted in various submodels, according to their respective different aspects and consequences.
The design strategy of TLM implies a three stage procedure, where first a simple model is constructed, so as to depict the triple layer structure and to del*neate the scope and detail of the i^odel (see also Hafkamp, 1983) .
The second step of the design procedure is the construction of a conceptual triple layer model and is described in the present section; the third step assembling the operational triple layer model, is dealt with in the next section.
The conceptual model presented here is a multi-regional model of an economy where economie, socio-political and environmental aspects of a society are of main importance. Public decision-making and planning in such a spatial system will be analyzed in a way analogous to allocation mechanisms in formalized economies with public goods and external effects (see also Ruys, 1975) . We shall explicitly deal with (groups of) individuals belonging to a certain region of the spatial system and to a certain interest group (e.g., environmentalists, labour unions). Table 1 .
In order to demonstrate the interactive compromise procedure we wi11 now discuss it step by step -using Figure 1 as a guideline -for several consecutive iterations.
1) Start
The problem is prepared for multi-objective optimization using a computed optimization package. In this; case the APEX optimization package (by CDC) was used. Therefore, we will assume some possible outcome of a negotiating or voting procedure.
The interactive compromise procedure thus carried out only provides a tentative scenario for a simulation experiment in multi-objective decision-making.
We carry out the procedure with a convergence speed parameter i = 0.50. The significance of this parameter will be discussed at step 6, where the constraints set is adjusted.
Iteration 1 2) Calculate Pay-Off Matrix
The pay-off matrix is found by optimising consecutively all 15 objectives. Every single optimi zation of these objectives leads to one column of the pay-off matrix, which is shown in Table 2 .
3) Generate Tentative Compromise Solution
In order to generate the tentative compromise solution, it is necessary to identify in the pay-off matrix the maximum and minimum value for each objective. This leads to the first and second column of Table 3 . The compromise solution is now found by minimizing a standardized distance function which measures the distance between feasible solutions and the ideal, but unfeasible maximum solution which is given in the first column of Table 3 . Minimization of (6.1) leads to the compromise solution whtch is the third column of Table 3 .
Solutions maximum minimum compromise
Region 1 income
A more illustrative representation of the resuUs eomprised in Table 3, is the diagram of Figure 3 . This diagram can be more easily interpreted by decision-makers. We will use it for the discussion of the other compromise solutions. Tables containing the actual outcomes are included in the appendix.
4) Compromise Solution Satisfactory ?
As discussed in
Step 1 of this procedure, we did not have actual voting results on compromise solutions reached. Instead we assumed possible outcomes of such procedures. At this point we assumed that, NO, the compromise solution of the first iteration was not satisfactory.
5) Identify Unsatisfactory Values of Objectives
We assumed the following regional objectives to be most urgently The pay-off matrix is derived in an analogous way to that of the previous iterations, taking into account the lower bounds on objectives which were raised in step 6 of the previous iteration. The pay-off matrix is included in the Appendix as Table A3 .
3) Generate Tentative Compromise Solution
Generation of the third compromise solution is identical to that of the previous iteration. Actual outcomes are contained in Table A4 (Appendix), while the diagram of Fig. 5 also represents these outcomes.
4) Compromise Solution Satisfactory ?
In order to demonstrate the procedure to its fuil extent we, again, assume that NO, the third compromise,is not satisfactory.
5) Identify Unsatisfactory Values of Objectives
We assume that environmental quality is to be raised in regions 1,3,4, and 5. In region 2 an improvement of income is assumed to be necessary.
6) Adjust Constraints Set
For the objectives selected in the previous step of this iteration lower bounds are adjusted according to the procedure described in step 6 of the first iteration. 
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3) Generate Tentative Compromise Solution
The fourth compromise solution contained in Table A 7 
5) Compromise Solution Satisfactory7
Assume yes; of course, the procedure can easily be continued through a number of more iterations. However, we shall not do so.
7) Tentative Compromise is Final Compromise
Clearly, from iteration to iteration, the interactive decisionmaking procedure not only gives information to the decisionmakers on the actual trade-offs between objectives (as inherent to the model), but also allows the analysts to deduce, from the choices of (groups of) individuals, the actual preferences. However, in order to arrive at an accurate assessment of these preferences, it would be necessary to carry out the procedure over a large number of iterations.
Concluding Remarks
The interactive multiobjective approaches to integrated economic-environmental decision-making in a spatial system' presented and applied in the previous sections, have several advantages over traditional approaches: -They reflect the process character of complex economicenvironmental policy problems; they constitute learning aids for policy-makers as wel! as for modelers. -They emphasize an active role of policy-makers in specifying and solving choice problems, inter al ia by making policy objectives and trade-offs more explicit -They are able to take into account the variety and the conflicting nature of policy options or criteria without requiring a prior specification of weights. -They provide an integrative framework for eliminating less relevant alternatives and for choosing consistent compromise solutions.
The simulation experiments of section 6 indicate that it is possible to adapt the interactive compromise procedure to varying institutional arrangements, even to multi-level decision-making procedures in which a national and regionai level are distinguished. 4 115.8 105.7 122.0 114.2 126.9 117.9 114.4 124.6 124.8 111.8 121.1 105.7 114.4 125.0  LI 115.4 115.8 114.8 115.1 115.8 113.1 114.4 115.8 112.1 115.4 115.8 111.1 108.4 115.8 
